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Name: Sean
Country: Japan
State: Okinawa
Birthday: 10/17/1983
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Member Since: 5/21/2004

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Saturday, February 25, 2006

NAFTA and Mexicofs Poor

Introduction

In the year 2000, soon-to-be President George W. Bush takes the stand in Miami, Florida, and gives his speech urging us to support the extension of NAFTA to Latin American countries. gMexico is an emerging success story,h he says. He claims that this liberalization gis our best weapon against poverty.h The North American Free Trade Agreement has generated a tremendous amount of international trade between the United States and Mexico. This increase in trade with our neighbors to the south has shown an improvement in the gross national product of nations on both sides of the fence. But has NAFTA helped to lift people out of poverty in Mexico?

In this report I plan to evaluate the effects of NAFTA on the impoverished people of Mexico. Much of the analysis will be drawn from raw data but articles depicting peoplefs personal viewpoints will also be included. I will use this information to display the major proponents of the agreement, as well as the negative impacts it may have had, and finally my own interpretation.

Before beginning to evaluate its effects, let us first examine what exactly NAFTA is, how it came into existence, and what its intended purpose is. NAFTA was a treaty signed by the nations of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, which greatly liberalized the trade barriers between nations in the region. Ratified by all three countries on January 1, 1994, NAFTA immediately eliminated tariffs on half of the U.S. goods shipped to Mexico, and was to phase out most other tariffs over a period of 14 years (Wikipedia, 2006b). The agreement was modeled after a previously existing free trade agreement between the United States and Canada. One of the main purposes of this agreement was to encourage trade amongst the countries of the region, and particularly attract U.S. foreign direct investment in Mexico. In theory this was supposed to help alleviate the poverty in Mexico, creating many new jobs in the factories that were to be created by the industry attracted. Many transnational corporations tend to be supporters of NAFTA in the hopes of cashing in on Mexicofs abundant resource of cheap labor, and also taking advantage of their lack of regulation on industry for environmental issues.



The Benefits

Looking solely at the GDP of Mexico and the United States during the time period between the ratification of NAFTA and now, one might be inclined to agree with President Bushfs claims. In fact, the GDP of Mexico has risen from $421.7 billion in 1994, to $676.5 billion in 2004 (World Bank, 2005). Meanwhile the United Statesf GDP rose to $12.6 trillion currently (Fedstats, 2006), up from $6.9 trillion in 1994 (Infoplease, 2005).

Advocates of NAFTA will say that this agreement even helped Mexico out of financial crisis in the early nineties, when the devaluation of the Mexican Peso invoked a crisis on the Mexican economy. Some, however, argue that Mexico would have survived the crisis on its own. Certainly the healthy financial assistance package of approximately $50 billion from the International Monetary Fund, the United States Government, and the Bank for International Settlements must have also played a huge role in their recovery (Wikipedia, 2006a).

To further the argument of the NAFTA enthusiasts, between 1993 and 2002, exports from Mexico to the U.S. increased by 14 percent annually, compared to the exports to the rest of the world, which was a mere 8 percent annually. Mexico has attracted $13 billion of foreign direct investment annually during this time period, mainly in the form of large industry created in the maquiladora district near the California border (Lifeline to Mexico, 2004).

The border region known was the maquiladora has had great success in the years since NAFTA. This region has drawn the interest and capital of more the 1,000 major electronics makers and other companies, which have opened production and assembly plants in Tijuana, Mexicali and Tecate. Among these companies are Newport Beach-based chipmaker Conexant Systems Inc. and Irvine-based television manufacturer Mitsubishi Digital Electronics America Inc. (Cziborr, 2001).

The current amount of exports to the United States from Mexico is up from $35 billion in 1992 to $33.5 trillion (Jette, 2004). In contrast the imports from the United States are only $22.7 trillion. This means that Mexico has been selling more to the United States than it has been buying from us, implying that there should be a great opportunity for them to benefit from this $10.8 billion profit (NationMaster, 2006).



The Shortcomings of NAFTA

However attractive all of these facts may seem, the real benefit of NAFTA is somewhat ambiguous considering the many variables that could have affected these increases in GDP, and the outcome of the Mexican Peso crisis. More importantly, who benefits from this increase in trade and foreign direct investment, and why, is not a question commonly answered in speeches such as the one quoted above. But looking at other statistics which are rarely boasted about by free trade supporters such as George W. Bush, it becomes very clear what NAFTA has not accomplished: lifting everyonefs boat.

The poorest 20 percent of Mexicans in 1998 earned 4.1 percent of the income. Since NAFTA, this amount has decreased gradually and is currently 3.5 percent (NationMaster, 2006). The richest 20 percent, however, have increased their share of income from 55.3 percent in 1998 to 57.4 percent (Kaul & Tomaselli, 1999). This could be a result of the approximately 20 to 25 percent of Mexican population who were employed in the agriculture industry, losing out to the cheap subsidized agricultural products from the United States. Although such a high percent of laborers were employed in the agricultural industry, this sector only represents 4 percent of their GDP, suggesting that the poorest 20 percent of the population are mostly agricultural workers (NationMaster, 2006).

As of the year 2000, 9.9 percent of the Mexican population still lived in under extreme poverty, which is a mere four percent decrease from the 1992 percentage of 14.9. According to the CIA World Factbook, 40 percent of the population still currently lives under relative poverty in Mexico. Even more of a shock is what standard is used to determine relative poverty in Mexico: $3.15 per day for rural workers or $4.60 per day for urban workers. This is a figure which has not changed in over 10 years, despite inflation and various other factors which affect purchasing power (Martinez, 2003).

In 2003, when Mexican President Vincente Fox announced that Poverty had been shrinking since the year 2000, much of the country was left thinking gWhat is he talking about?h To personify the masses of Mexicans living slightly above this poverty line, consider Esteban Solano. Solano is a Mexican farmhand who earns $4.50 a day. In his eyes, he lives in poverty, but according to government standards he is $1.35 above the poverty line. After leaving a Veracruz ranch where the rainy season washes away all jobs, even ones that pay as little as $2 a day, he is interviewed by reporters. When questioned about the government findings about the decreased amount of poverty in Mexico, he says gItfs a lie. There are a lot-a lot-of poor people in Mexico. There are a lot of people searching for work. I donft see the change.h Like many of Mexicofs poor, Solano is considering going to the United States if he cannot find work (Martinez, 2003).

The emigration of workers to the U.S., both legal and illegal, is one factor that may have alleviated some of the poverty in Mexico. An average Mexican worker sends about $1,000 a year home. This amount alone is just 42 cents per day below the poverty line. These remittances jumped from $6.6 billion in 2000, to $9.9 billion in 2002 (Martinez, 2003). This increased amount of emigration to the United States goes to further the argument that NAFTA has not solved the poverty problem in Mexico. If there were sufficient adequately paying jobs in their homeland, why would they be fleeing across the boarding at such large numbers?

While unemployment has decreased in the NAFTA years, underemployment is still a problem. According to the CIA World Factbook, the unemployment rate in Mexico is only 3.6 percent, but they estimate that as many as 25 percent are underemployed.

Some argue that the tax laws in Mexico have not served to help the impoverished people of its lands. The average governmentfs percent of GDP that comes from taxes is about 38 percent. However, taxation in Mexico only accounts for 11 percent of its GDP (gMexicofs New Hope,h 2003). Without reliable tax income, the government can not make necessary improvements of which they are in dire need. Although over the recent years, the government has offered incentive programs for farmers to get an education, these are hardly adequate, and do not compensate for the amount of crops



Conclusion

Over the more recent years, FDI in Mexico from the United States has shown a leveling off. In order to increase FDI, the Mexican government must take steps to improve conditions in order to make it more attractive to the investorfs eye. These improvements would include infrastructure upgrades and better education. A slight increase in taxation and a crackdown on tax evasion would raise revenue for the government while not being too high to scare off potential investors from across the border. Failure to do so has definitely taken away from the benefits they could be getting from NAFTA. According to one of President Vincente Foxfs advisors, Mexico could profit $10 billion per year from simply collecting back taxes (gMexicofs New Hope,h 2003).

Although some domestic issues such as inadequate taxation, inferior infrastructure, and government corruption may have adverse effects on the poverty which plagues Mexico, these shortcomings are not the only problem with the agreement. The elimination of trade tariffs on agricultural products was a step in the wrong direction for Mexico because their government does not have sufficient programs to support the increased amount of unemployed farmers. At this point, it would be almost impossible for their agriculture industry to compete with the highly sophisticated farms in the United States. Therefore, the only choice is to educate the agricultural workers who would then be able to pursue other careers. This would take much longer than the amount of time allotted by the provisions of NAFTA.

Another improvement that could be made by the Mexican government, would be to give incentives for opening factories and other employment opportunities in the poorer districts of Mexico that have been hit hardest by NAFTA.

In summary, the benefits of NAFTA have been predominately in favor of the wealthy, which is illustrated by the income distribution statistics previously mentioned in the report. This has contributed to the increased stratification of its rich and poor social classes. It all boils down to the age old saying gIt takes money to make money.h And the ones who already have money are making much more from this liberalization of trade laws. Some good can be made of this, but some of the changes mentioned in this report are necessary to make progress in uplifting the poor and bringing equity to the income distribution of Mexico.


Wednesday, February 15, 2006

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

 

 

April 13, 1961

 

MEMORANDUM FOR:    THE PRESIDENT

FROM:              SEAN OGDEN

SUBJECT:           Zapata Plan

 

     The purpose of this memorandum is to assess the problems with the current plan to overthrow the Castro government in Cuba through the use of Brigade 2506.

 

Strategic Disadvantages

     The Zapata landing location has not been sufficiently reviewed in terms of strategic advantage.  Many assumptions have been made due to the similarities of this location and the previously reviewed Trinidad approach (Aguilar, 14).  Up until this point, it has been taken for granted that, if presented with a difficult situation, the landing forces would be able to retreat to the mountains and act as guerillas.  However, after further review, this possibility is apparently impossible due to the vicinity of the Zapata beachhead.

     Compared to the size of the 36-mile beachhead, and considering the imminent enemy resistance anticipated, the landing force is too small (Aguilar, 41).  The majority of Brigade 2506 is amateur, and has had no prior combat experience, which makes it even more unlikely that they would be able to overcome the much larger opposition force.

     This type of beachhead assault would only be possible if our covert forces had superior air support.  Currently the T/E for this operation only includes B-26es, which are obsolete.  Furthermore, being a bomber plane, a B-26 is designed to support only air-to-ground cover (Aguilar, 41).  In the event that Castro were to dispatch his planes, which are superior T-33s, our planes would have no way of combating them.  The invasion force would then be left sitting ducks on an open beach (Montaner, 199).  The ships containing extra supplies would also be at risk, and are likely to be the primary target of enemy aircraft (Aguilar, 20).  Without these supplies, our brigade has absolutely no chance of holding the beachhead long enough to influence anti-Castro Cubans to aid in the attack.

     Thomas Mann of the State Department reported that “ultimate success” of a landing was based upon “a sizable popular uprising or substantial follow on forces.”  However, he includes, such an uprising is “unlikely,” and therefore this should not be assumed (Higgins, 50).  Without the popular support of people within Cuba, a mere two battalions of ill-equipped and insufficiently trained Cuban exiles are not even close to enough to fight Castro’s army, which is currently the largest in Latin America at 240,000 troops.  Castro has also boasted about receiving massive arms shipments from the Czechs (Higgins, 62).

 

Deniability

Castro himself has announced to over half a million of his people, an accurate description of our plan of action, and our training camps in Guatemala.  He also included that the revolutionaries were being supported by the CIA and the State Department (Higgins, 51).  Although this could be a product of his paranoia, his description is much too accurate for comfort.  These plans have also been widely published in American periodicals since the beginning of this month.

As mentioned above, this operation is not likely to be a success without proper air support, which means the use of jets.  This is not an option as it would definitely reveal our role in supporting the attack.  According to Brigadier General Cushman, Nixon’s aide, the operation is too large, and at this size, “everybody in the world would know the US is behind this (Higgins, 63).”

If the landing forces are to be overrun, they would require the support of American troops, which is not a viable option if we want to keep our involvement a secret.  We would have to abandon them.  There is a risk of captured invaders revealing our role in the operation out of spite for lack of support.

 

Possible Aftermath

     The abandoning of our invasion force would immediately result in a loss of U.S. prestige.  This type of operation is entirely against our policy, and if discovered would greatly reduce our credibility amongst our allies, as well as our enemies.  The violation of U.S. treaties would result in a loss of support from our allies in the Organization of American States, as well as the United Nations (Higgins, 50).

     Castro, whose support is mostly based on anti-American sentiment, would like nothing more than to have another reason to enrage the people of Cuba and fuel his revolution.  If the attempted overthrow is not successful, this could backfire on us, and strengthen popularity for Castro in Cuba.  In 1959, Castro said any American intervention attempt in Cuba would result in 200,000 dead gringos in Cuba (Higgins, 43).  Judging by the repressive nature of the Castro government, it is likely that he will react harshly to Cuban citizens in search of any suspicious persons likely to have taken part in the attacks.  This would essentially, through fear of execution, crush any possibility of another anti-Castro uprising amongst the citizens within the country (Montaner, 199).

     By invading Cuba, we would essentially be giving an open invitation for the Soviets to come into our hemisphere (Lafeber, 224).  In a speech by Nikita Khrushchev last year, he states:

It should be borne in mind that the United States is now not at such an inaccessible distance from the Soviet Union as formerly. Figuratively speaking, if need be, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire, should the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to start intervention against Cuba. And the Pentagon would be Well advised not to forget that, as has been shown by the latest tests, we have rockets which land accurately in a predetermined square target 13,000 kilometers away. This, if you wish, is a warning to those who might like to solve international problems by force and riot by reason (Khrushchev, 1960).

With the support of such a super-power, further attempts to overthrow or assassinate Fidel Castro would be futile.  The United States can not afford to have our enemies stationed just 90 miles off our coast.

 

Conclusion

     Due to the inherent risks of this operation, the impossibility of denial, and the copious amount of possible negative impacts, it is imperative that we call off the attack.  There is no doubt that such an operation will result in an embarrassment to the American government, and undermine our international credibility.


References

 

Aguilar, L. (1981). Operation Zapata: The “ultrasensitive” report and testimony of the board of inquiry on the Bay of Pigs. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, Inc.

 

Higgins, T. (1987). The perfect failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs. Ontario, Canada: Penguin Books Canada Ltd.

 

Khrushchev, N. (1960). Speech to the RFSR Teacher's Congress. Retrieved February 12, 2006 from http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1960khrushchev-cuba1.html.

 

Lafeber, W. (2002). America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2000.  New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

 

Montaner, C. A. (1981). Secret report on the Cuban Revolution. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Inc.

 


Tuesday, February 07, 2006

Sometimes I just dont understand other dudes.  So many guys get gf's and they wanna shelter them from the outside world of other men because they're so insecure about their own ability to please them.  I mean, she is YOUR girlfriend right?  So doesn't that tell you something?  She obviously already chose you, so whats the big deal right?  Its like guys wanna be Kim Jong Il, and treat their girl like they're North Korea.  And what I understand even less, is why do girls allow their men to treat them like that?  I mean really, who actually enjoys having their choice of friends dominated by someone elses insecurities?  And as for the men, if you really loved ur girl, you would wanna let them do whatever makes them happy, even if they did find another man that made them happier.  I'm not saying that this would happen, I'm just saying that if you were the man for your girl, then you should have nothing to worry about.  HAVE CONFIDENCE.

Next topic, this summer.  Due to my healthy tax refund, and the fact that I miss it like crazy, I will be returning to Okinawa this summer after my study abroad program finishes.  So if you're from Oki, and you read this, let me sleep on your couch!!  haha just kidding I already have a place to stay, but we should all definitely hang at the beach or by the sea wall, go to some matsuri and do some hanabi!

For other people who live around here, if I've been avoiding you lately, I'm sorry.  I've been writing a very long and somewhat depressing paper about the inadequacies of NAFTA in solving the poverty problem in Mexico.  I wish I had the power to fix it.  But I dont.


Tuesday, October 11, 2005

今日はとてもどんよりした天気で、陰気な日でした。数学の試験を受けたけど、時間がなくて終われなかった。点数は悪かったけど、時間があればもっとちゃんと出来たのに!昨日何時間も勉強したからちょっとがっかりした。

その後、日本語の授業があった。日本語を話したら日本に住んでた時のいい思い出を思い出すからいつもこのクラスを楽しみにしています。今日の授業の終わりに丸先 生が「また会いたいけど会えない人がいますか。」と聞いた。最初は沖縄に住んでる与那覇なつえという友達の事を考えた。私は沖縄にいた時、なつえは彼氏 が東京の大学に通ってたからいつも私と遊びたがっていた。毎週居酒屋に行ったり、BBQをしたりした。よく一杯レストランのことがのっている雑誌で面白い食堂をみつ けて、一緒に食べに行った。こういうことから彼女は本当に仲の良い友達になった。

次はほかの友人のことを色々考えて、最後には星野彩と言う女の子を思い出した。一年ちょっと前ぐらいに他の大学で日本語の授業で彩に会った。私達は他の学 生より日本語が上手だったからいつも一緒に練習していました。そろそろ、私は彩に聞いた。「いつかコーヒーを飲みに行きませんか。」「もちろん、最近沖縄 に引っ越したからまだ友達が少ないからいつでも行ける。」と彼女は答えた。この日から二ヶ月毎日付き合った。月見したり、私がギターを弾いて一緒に 歌ったり、カラオケによくデートで行ったりした。ある日一ヶ月のひみつ軍事演習で韓国に行かせられた。この演習では電話とかパソコンが全然なかったから音信は 無理だった。ひみつだったから誰にも教えられなかった。ずっと大好きな彩がいなくてさびしかった。

沖縄に戻ったら、彼女と一緒にやりたいことがたくさんあったけど、彩を見つけられなかった。私が韓国にいた時に彼女はアメリカに帰国しました。彼女は基地に 入っては行けなかったから手紙を置くことが出来なかった。それとも彩さんは私がどこに行ったか分からなかったから多分僕に怒っていたと思う。またいつか星野彩 さんに会いたいけど会えないと思う。

学校が終わって、友達とリーズオリエンタルマーケットに行って、たくさん焼きそばとかお好み焼きソースとか買った。後でアパートでおいしい焼きそばをつくって、一緒に食べた。久しぶりに日本の料理を食べたからなつかしかった。今度丸先生にご飯を作ってあげようと思う。